It still has an appearance of Honecker and Soviet Union, when it is once again said that in Beijing Central Committee of Communist Party of China days. Just like this week, when ZK, a kind of party parliament with around 200 deputies, prepares party congress, starting on October 18th, to which more than 2,000 senior officials from all over China will meet.
Despite all socialist sobriety, party Congress is of central importance, but every five years it is confirmed by management staff for near future. Personnel for a state that has already become a leading economic nation in absolute terms and is now also striving to expand geographically: through economic initiatives such as New Silk Road, but also militarily as in South China Sea.
Reason enough to take a closer look at this process, or at least little that is known to outside. China's autocratic party Granden does not talk about careers being decided in secret. It is certain that Party leader Xi Jinping will be confirmed for a furr five years in Office of Secretary-General and that he is trying to bring as many followers as possible into newly-assembled politburo, highest Führungsgremiun of China with 25 members, and in Its Standing Committee (seven members). Such a Komiteeprinzip goes through party into villages of China and across important ministries, for example for public security, economy or propaganda. And this structure has proved to be astonishing durabel.
More competencies for party leaderSince 1949, China has been successfully dominated in this way by Communist Party, which has been organized in core since 1920s by a strictly hierarchical party discipline according to Leninist model. The power in committees and departments have those who control access to important posts. Through ir Leninist institutions, Communist parties were among longest-lived authoritarian regimes of industrial age, says Victor Shih, a political scientist at University of San Diego in United States. The special feature of China is that since 1980s, KP has adopted Socialist Plan economy and allowed for unbridled capitalism.
A mixture of trust and fear, which determines relationship to higher cadres, gives party institutions, according to Shih, a robustness that makes room for institutional shifts and power struggles in governing bodies possible. In case of current party chief Xi Jinping, it was 2012 decision of party elite to grant n new Secretary-General more political authority. This did not only mean that China's party-driven media have been paying homage to party leader since n, and cadres are now reading books with speeches and citations from Secretary-General and have to take more central control.
In practice, centralization means that China's government authorities lost competencies in favor of new party committees. Committees that occupy important policy areas such as economic reforms, digitisation or military, and also have necessary changes and monitoring. In important party committees, Xi is said to have say in end.
An occasion for pronounced centralisation was obviously also rampant corruption among party officials, a problem that is virulent in Einparteienstaaten without independent justice. Xi Jinping had a anti in party and government by Wang Qishan, his confidant in Politburo, who, although bulk of cases concerned Dorfkader, showed no mercy even with top cadres. The campaign is popular in corrupt people and helps party leader to get rid of unwelcome political opponents, but also slows down meaningful initiatives of its own.
Date Of Update: 11 October 2017, 12:06
